专访拉迪卡·德赛：华盛顿正在发小孩脾气

liukang20241个月前 (05-16)cgw吃瓜835

长安街知事 | 记者刘晓琰

本年4月，巴西总统卢拉访华期间提出过一个重要问题：“我每天晚上都会抚躬自问，为什么一切国家间的交易都要依据美元结算？”

这份质疑也被带到了南非，带到了金砖国家领导人的评论桌上，添加辅币结算规划成为了8月金砖国家领导人峰会的重要议题之一。

据今天俄罗斯电视台（RT）网站9日报导，俄罗斯交际部官员标明，俄方在与我国的交易中现已“实际上完结去美元化”，美元在两边交易中的运用比例已降至前史低点。

假如美元在国际钱银系统中不再具有霸主位置，新的国际钱银系统会是什么样？“一带一路”建造在此间发挥了什么效果？美国官员不断地抹黑我国“一带一路”建议，宣传“去危险化”，露出美方何种战略窘境？中美是否现已堕入了“新暗斗”？

加拿大曼尼托巴大学政治学教授拉迪卡·德赛就“去美元化”、“一带一路”建议的影响及中美联系等与记者进行了共享。

美元系统的完结现已隐约可见

知事：美国最大的力气源于它具有国际上最首要的储藏钱银，这给予美国巨大的购买力。但咱们看到，包含美国国债在内的美国财物吸引力正在削弱，美元在全球央行国际储藏中的占比已下降超越10个百分点。您以为美元系统正面对哪些方面的危机？为什么会呈现这些危机？

拉迪卡·德赛: 整体而言，当咱们议论美元系统时，可以看到两种天壤之别的学术观念。

第一种不断地假定美元系统是彻底天然的，可以永久持续下去。实际上，整个学术界都在向全国际宣传美元系统是多么超卓，而我的研究成果并非如此。

第二种观念是去美元化，并指出美元面对的困难，特别是着重美元代替方案的兴起，例如各国央行之间的交换协议，国家之间以对方钱银进行交易的协议，新组织的兴起，比方我国在国际协作项目中立异金融支撑，“一带一路”建议中的丝路基金便是一个重要的比方。

在深化探求了对美元的溢美之词之后，我以为第一种观念彻底是过错的，而第二种观念正确但不完好。要充沛了解今世的去美元化现象，有必要考虑两个方面：

首要，代替方案的呈现；其次，美元系统内部长期存在的对立。

你说到，美国长期以来一向是国际钱银。但现实是，美国从未稳定地作为国际钱银存在，这是问题的要害。你还着重了一个观念，这也是文献中重复呈现的观念，即美国享有“超级特权”，可以随意借入本国钱银并进行无限制的印钞。实际上，这并不是真实状况，可以从美国国债商场的疲柔和弱化中得到证明。另一个很风趣的比方是，拜登总统上台时满怀期望地方案大举开销，以修正美国经济、改进医疗系统等。但实际上，他的开销方案适当有限。即便如此，他还不得不前进税收。假如美国可以毫不受限地借钱，为什么要前进税收呢？

要真实了解美元系统的开展，对其内涵对立的了解至关重要。我以为这些对立源于对美元霸权的误解，即最有影响力或最强大国家的钱银天可是然地成为国际钱银。实际上，前史与这一观念相对立。回溯到20世纪初，美国操控精英曾企图将美元确立为国际首要钱银，他们想象其相似于19世纪和20世纪初英镑的人物。可是，促进英镑全球位置的环境是特别的，根植于英国宽广的帝国边境以及从非移民殖民地取得的盈利。加拿大和新西兰等移民殖民地与非洲和英属印度等非移民殖民地之间的差异至关重要。在这段时期，非移民殖民地基本上在为移民殖民地的工业化付费，这便是英镑的运作办法，是英国能顾向国际供给活动性“本钱输出”的原因。

可是，美国没有殖民地可以从中提取盈利，只能经过赤字发行美元并供给全球活动性。这些赤字一向是个问题。比利时经济学家罗伯特·特里芬在20世纪50年代末着重了这一窘境：虽然赤字供给了全球活动性，但一起也削弱了美元的吸引力，施加了向下的压力，这便是闻名的“特里芬窘境”。这种状况导致美国不得不付出黄金，而不是美元。终究，到1971年，黄金一旦快要耗尽，美国就不得不打破美元与黄金之间的联络。

我在《地缘政治经济学》一书中论说过，在1971年之后，美国为了战胜“特里芬窘境”，处理赤字问题，下降了美元的价值，经过扩展以美元计价的金融活动以补偿赤字。究竟人们有或许出于交易和出资等原因不想要美元，但为了投机，他们依然需求美元。在这场长达数十年的大型金融博弈中，美国不得不持续扩展以美元计价的金融活动。这种活动极为不稳定，不只不利于美国的经济，削弱了其出产才能，关于其他国家来说也是一场灾祸，由于这会导致定时的金融危机，1997年亚洲金融危机和2008年美国金融危机便是比方。

总归，美元系统现在的疲态可以追溯到美国在坚持这场金融博弈方面才能的下降。跟着博弈开端走向溃散，美元系统的完结现已隐约可见。

知事：您方才从前史的视点谈到了美元系统的内部对立，让我想到了美元的信赖问题，它是维系美元作为全球储藏钱银的要害支柱。可是最近几十年来，这种信赖现已开端弱化，美国金融系统正在被当作一种霸权主义的东西，用来扣押他国财物，俄罗斯、阿富汗和委内瑞拉都是比方。这对美元的诺言有什么影响？

拉迪卡·德赛: 你说到的正是人们近年来称之为美元系统的兵器化。我想再次着重，美元系统一向是为了美国的利益而运转。国际之所以运用美元，是由于他们没有代替选择。早在1944年布雷顿森林会议上，美国基本上就回绝了凯恩斯关于多边组织钱银的建议。从那时起，美国一向致力于炸毁一切新式的代替方案。可是，现在美国的才能现已削弱，这便是代替方案正在呈现的原因。

现在，回到美元系统的兵器化，你说得彻底正确，近年来，美元系统被以为是美国政府采纳的一项更大战略的一部分，旨在推迟美国的式微和其经济的下滑。这种式微冲击了美国在全球业务中施加影响的才能，反映了美国实力的下降和帝国主义的式微。对此，美国运用各种手法改进局势，并赏罚那些应战其主导位置的国家。正如你说到的，最近的状况包含从俄罗斯、阿富汗、委内瑞拉、伊朗等国家没收财物，这些国家在前史上也倍受美国苛待。

值得注意的是，这种行为引发了更高度的警惕，特别是在俄罗斯的事例中。作为联合国安理会常任理事会和重要的国际大国，也难逃被美国金融制裁并没收海外财物，让国际愈加意识到美元兵器化问题的严峻性。

另一个需求考虑的要害要素是，美元系统的支撑之一是许多国家坚持本钱账户敞开。这是个让人头疼的过错决议，意味着这些国家的有钱人总可以拿他们的钱出资于美元系统，或许带去美国进行金融博弈，究竟美元系统彻底是一个投机系统。而我国对本钱账户的办理标明，坚持对本钱活动的操控，可以在不依靠以美国为中心的金融系统的状况下，完成财富堆集和国家实力的添加，即有用的本钱账户办理关于开展和保存国内财富至关重要。假如更多国家选用这种办法，美元系统的根底将会进一步被腐蚀。

与此一起，我国及其他金砖国家现已开端参议创立新的国际钱银系统，金砖国家彻底可以有一个独立的付出和金融系统，专心于出产和交易。在美元系统内，第三国际国家常常面对金融危机、钱银贬值和本钱外逃的危险，而新系统将协助它们更好地躲避此类危险。

2022年12月21日，莫斯科一家钱银兑换处，美元标志呈现在一块黑板上。图源：视觉我国

知事：说起第三国际国家，近来美西方常常污蔑我国在“一带一路”沿线制作“债款圈套”。您怎么看待开展我国家债款问题？导致这个问题益发严峻的元凶巨恶究竟是谁？

拉迪卡·德赛: 的确，西方国家与第三国际国家之间的金融联系一向充满着复杂性。

一方面，西方国家有志愿借钱给第三国际国家，首要是为了有时机收取高利息。此外，这些国家的金融组织具有很多现金储藏，有必要寻觅赚取利息的途径，也促进了这种放贷志愿，。因而，它们欢迎第三国际国家来告贷，高喊着“快进来，从咱们这儿借钱”。

另一方面，它们放出去的借款远超对方可持续归还的才能。西方国家借款条件和意图都不是出产性的，低效率的投进意味着债款回收难度添加，这也是部分国家在西方系统下债款危机频发的原因，这要归咎于西方金融系统对归还可行性的无视。自1982年第三国际债款危机以来，这种无视现象备受重视。从那时起，美国及其盟国基本上忽视了债款问题呈现时债款人和债权人一起负有责任的基本准则。

在曩昔的十五年中，我国现已在全球金融领域中锋芒毕露。这使得我国成为重要的借款国，引发了西方国家的反响，企图将他们策划的债款问题归咎于我国，这正是问题的要害。西方大国宣称我国从事一种被称为“债款圈套交际”的做法。现实上，前史上制作债款圈套的正是西方国家。乃至在上世纪70年代，就有一本书题为《债款圈套》着重了这种方法，西方国家常常会诱惑第三国际国家堕入债款圈套。

正如你所指出的，假如人们细心检查我国的假贷数量和质量，就会发现我国债款在第三国际国家债款总额中所占的比例依然相对较小。而且我国遍及将借款用于出产意图，用于出资根底设施建造。而且面对归还困难的国家，我国乐意进行债款重组。这与西方的做法形成了鲜明对比。

自20世纪80年代以来，西方关于堕入债款危机中的国家强制施行了严苛的结构调整方案，强加的紧缩办法致使这些国家的人们越是努力工作，越是赤贫，经济开展堕入萎缩，失去了很多的开展机会。这才是真实的债款圈套。

知事：在美元系统之外，正在呈现一系列代替方案。我国央行现已发明晰一种数字钱银，这将下降我国遭到美国制裁的危险。沙特和巴西等国现已标明，将推进用人民币同我国进行交易结算。您以为人民币国际化对国际社会有哪些意义，怎么看待人民币国际化在曩昔几年中的开展和成果？

拉迪卡·德赛:许多坚持以为美元系统永续的人，其首要观念便是现在并没有显着的代替钱银。但假如咱们认识到包含英镑系统在内的过往国际钱银系统中的前史失衡，并供认美元系统本身存在缺点，咱们就会发现，去美元化并不一定需求呈现显着的代替钱银，它彻底可以在新式国际钱银系统结构中打开。

这是人民币国际化的更大布景。人民币正在国际化，且速度越来越快，这是功德。但人民币国际化的方法将与美元系统的国际化办法彻底不同。

美元的国际化背面是投机和掠夺性的金融系统，这与我国和其他国家的可持续开展方针各走各路。我国的领导层十分清楚开展的必要性，人民币的国际化将与开展方针坚持一致，既对我国本身而言，也对参加协作开展方案（如“一带一路”建议和亚洲根底设施出资银行）的国家而言。

为了交易意图，我国肯定会持续推进人民币的国际化。但我国也在做其他工作，例如和多国签定钱银交换协议等，这将打造出一个与以美元为中心的方法天壤之别的国际金融系统。

我以为，假如我国政府寻求一种相似于美元的人民币国际化办法，那么我国的开展将会受阻。由于中美两国的金融系统十分不同，我国的系统着重出产性出资，而不是投机性借款，保证金融与出产严密相连。为了坚持这种银行与工业之间的共生结构，我国有必要寻求一条共同的人民币国际化之路。

无论怎么，我国不期望寻求美元的那种国际化办法，那是一种“操控”方法。我国不寻求霸权，将尽其所能地促进国际的多极化和一起开展。但我国难以单独做到这一点，国际上其他国家也有必要培育可以推进本国开展的领导力，它们也需求为自己的开展担任，就像我国为自己的开展担任相同。

总归，人民币的国际化代表了钱银国际化传统轨道的一种改动。只需我国在很长一段时刻内坚持重要的国际位置，人民币就会是无足轻重的钱银。最重要的是，人民币将发挥重要效果，而不寻求独家主导位置。

知事：假如美元不再是国际钱银，那么国际钱银会是什么？

拉迪卡·德赛: 这正是我想说的，国际上不会有单一的储藏钱银。人民币或许是其间最重要的一种，但各国将依据自己的交易、出资和金融需求，保存一种储藏钱银组合。

西方国家的责备是“贼喊抓贼”

知事：您眼里的“一带一路”是一个什么样的建议，整体形象怎么？“一带一路”建议对全球经济、地缘政治和国际协作带来了哪些影响？

拉迪卡·德赛: 我以为“一带一路”建议是一项巨大的方案。经过丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路，我国可以触及整个国际。经过这个建议，我国以优于西方的条件，与国际其他地区打开协作。

首要，“一带一路”建议是我国支撑本身开展的绝佳办法，也发明晰一种持续蓬勃开展的方法。

其次，在全球经济方面，它有助于扩展全球经济，完成更高更好的添加。

第三，在地缘政治方面，它肯定是革新的前沿。跟着西方国家的相对式微，西方经济，特别是美国经济在全球经济中的比例削减，人们开端重视金砖国家等新式力气。西方的式微以及我国和其他新式大国的兴起正在重塑地缘政治格式，我国处于这种革新的前沿。

最终，在国际管理方面，“一带一路”建议正在为新式国际管理机制打下根底。人们一般以为布雷顿森林系统是一个巨大的系统，但他们往往忽视一个现实，即美国在规划中的干涉，使其实质上成为一个倾向于美国和帝国主义国家的国际管理组织。

可是,现在的国际正挨近一个新式国际管理系统的临界点，标志着向后帝国主义全球管理结构的改动，其根底树立在相互协作、互利互惠的准则上，而不是像国际银行、国际钱银基金组织和国际交易组织等组织，依靠帝国权利和隶属联系。

但联合国是破例。联合国在国际经济管理革新中发挥着重要效果。联合国宪章依据许多优异的准则，但它们跟着时刻的推移而遭到了腐蚀。咱们应该回到联合国宪章的主旨准则下，这在后帝国主义全球管理中将具有重要意义。

在曩昔的几十年里，美西方一向在将联合国组织与企业资金，特别是来自西方的企业资金相结合，成果往往会削弱联合国组织的根底。在我看来，联合国应该进行一次革新，回到开端的想象，朝着由成员国赞助的方向开展。这将保证联合国初心和举动的一致性。在这点上，我估计我国将在树立后帝国主义全球管理系统方面发挥主导效果。

知事：您以为“一带一路”项目在国际上正面对哪些应战？这些应战的本源是什么？

拉迪卡·德赛: 这也是一个十分重要的问题，由于当今国际秩序中的不稳定本源，并不是我国或其他国家的兴起，而是西方对这种兴起的坚决抵抗。我国和其他国家不该盼望西方会很快改动态度。我估计西方或许会因多种要素的结合而发生变化，其间包含来自我国不断增强的影响力,以及国际越来越倾向于我国而不是美国的外部压力，这些压力将跟着时刻的推移而添加。这些国家的民众或许会意识到其国内管理和全球互动中固有的缺点，意识到这两个方面都需求全面变革。

在山东威海港，“齐鲁号”中亚班列慢慢驶出。

知事：咱们注意到，美国近年来推广一系列反华方针，欲针对我国挑起“新暗斗”。在这种暗斗思想与零和博弈思想下，美国把“一带一路”建议视作我国以经济利益为钓饵进行意识形态扩张与地缘政治抢夺。您怎么看待美国这种“新暗斗”方针？对全球政治和经济格式形成哪些影响？

拉迪卡·德赛:“新暗斗”这个词大致可以追溯到特朗普总统任内。美国企图对我国发起的“新暗斗”有以下特色：

在上世纪90年代，美国想象经过与我国树立更友爱的联系，让我国持续扮演低本钱劳动力驱动下出产廉价产品的隶属人物。可是，跟着新世纪的到来，特别是2008年金融危机后，人们逐步意识到我国不会抛弃其社会主义许诺，不会抛弃开展经济的许诺，更不会抛弃出产技能晋级的许诺。在认识到这一点后，西方国家逐步采纳了更具对立性的行为，企图挑起针对我国的“新暗斗”。

美国及其盟友面对的问题是，这些举动并没有成功，包含欧洲在内的许多国家对美国的制裁及其治外法权标明不满，这些制裁阻止了欧洲的对华交易。

现在看来，欧洲领导人好像会持续支撑现状，但坦率地说，考虑到欧洲正接受的经济压力，我不确定这种状况是否可以长时刻坚持下去。虽然西方在宣传联合，但在这种所谓的联合中，其实蕴含着严峻的不稳定。

总归，企图挑起针对我国的“新暗斗”，注定无法到达其方针。虽然它的确会对我国构成应战，但都是我国有才能应对的。别的，美西方的举动标明，他们所宣传的“支撑全球各国一起开展”的许诺实际上十分虚伪，一旦这个国际上呈现像我国相同迅速开展的经济体，他们就会体现得歇斯底里。

知事：美国总统拜登清晰标明不寻求“新暗斗”，而另一边则玩着集团政治的游戏，宣传“民主对立威权”的虚伪叙事。您怎么看待美国这种言而无信的做法？

拉迪卡·德赛: 这是一个十分风趣的问题，咱们有必要认识到美国现现已历了多大程度的阑珊。美国国内日益加重的不相等导致了深入的社会和政治不合。这些不合导致了一种新的政治方法，它越来越重视美国内部问题，意图是为了赢得推举，而不是真实处理问题。政客们，无论是特朗普仍是拜登，都运用这些问题来做大选的说辞，但其实他们什么也处理不了。

还记得在日本举行G7会议时，拜登总统不得不提早回国，由于他有必要处理债款上限危机。美国两党之间的尖利抵触，以及美国社会内部各阶级根深柢固的不合，源于美国国际位置的下降和国内不断加重的不相等。

最初咱们都期望拜登中选后，可以反转特朗普政府的方针。但适得其反，他采纳了愈加反华的态度，乃至还与俄罗斯掀起了新抵触，这点连特朗普都不敢做。原因十分简略：假如拜登不投合最初导致特朗普上台的那些要素，他很难取得连任。为了中选，拜登在资金开销方面显着超越了特朗普。在即将到来的推举中，假如要与相似特朗普的提名人竞赛，他将不得不再次大幅添加开销，而且有必要比最初和特朗普竞赛时花得更多。

总归，这种“新暗斗”和相似方针本源于美国国内外开展的窘境，它在短时刻内不太或许发生变化。一个好的美国领导人，应该告知美国人，美国需求专心于复兴其出产经济，退出对外国抵触的参加，促进国内更大的相等，致力于处理问题的本源，而不是告知那些正在遭受痛苦的人，问题的本源是我国，咱们有必要对我国发起进犯。

知事：近期，美国政府频频运用“去危险”的论调，让欧洲也回绝向我国供给要害技能。您怎么看待“去危险化”这个词？

拉迪卡·德赛: 这无疑是“新暗斗”的一种反映，突显了问题的性质。在曩昔的二三十年，美国的经济现已很大程度地依靠我国。可是，跟着我国技能的前进，以硅谷为代表的部分实力发生了危机感，建议针对我国打开一种新方法的全球竞赛。而另一些人则说，不，咱们为什么要这样做？咱们负担不起危险和本钱。因而，美国精英阶级内部在触及我国的方针问题上其实有适当大的不合和不确定性。这种不确定性也延伸到了美国的盟友中，欧洲人和日自己期望持续与我国进行交易，他们不想要一场“新暗斗”。

很显然，一些人从前议论过测验与我国“脱钩”，然后发现这不正确、不可行，与我国“脱钩”将给美国带来灾祸。虽然中美经济联系有所松动，但彻底“脱钩”将对美国发生严峻的负面影响。

退而求其次，他们又发明晰“去危险”一词作为代替，一边企图挑起“新暗斗”，一边应对由此带来的不可防止的经济动乱。但坦率地说，欧洲领导人，乃至拜登自己，未必真实了解“去危险”这个词的悉数意义。他们其实是在黑暗中摸索，处于进退维谷的地步。

知事：您觉得中美应该怎么防止“新暗斗”？

拉迪卡·德赛: 现在，我国所做的一切都是为了防止两国堕入“新暗斗”的漩涡。比方，我国高标准接待了来访的美国国务卿布林肯，也欢迎美国其他高官来访。我国知道自己在做什么，也做得很好。重要的是要向国际证明，我国现已极力修正两国联系，中美两国具有广泛的一起利益，没有理由回绝协作共赢。

问题在于，美国好像对这样的联系不感兴趣。美国期望树立一个可以单方面获益的联系，想要鱼与熊掌兼得，这是不或许的。就像一个孩子想要一起吃饭和睡觉，做不到就开端哭闹。这便是咱们所看到的美国在愤恨中的反响——一次又一次地发脾气。

以下为采访原文：

The Radhika Desai Interview: What Happens If the U.S. Dollar Crashes

As the 15th summit of BRICS leaders concluded in Johannesburg, South Africa, the topic of "de-dollarization" has become a hot subject of discussion.

During his visit to China in April of this year, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of the New Development Bank of BRICS.

At that time, he said, "Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar. Why can't we do trade based on our own currencies?"

This skepticism was brought to South Africa and discussed among the BRICS leaders, making the expansion of currency settlements in local currencies one of the topics of this BRICS summit.

If the U.S. dollar no longer holds its dominant position in the international monetary system, what would the new international monetary system look like? What role does the "Belt and Road Initiative" play in it? US officials continuously criticize China's Belt and Road Initiative and advocate for "de-risking," revealing what strategic dilemma on the part of the US? Have China and the US already entered a "new Cold War"?

Capital News, in collaboration with RDCY, has launched the "Global Governance Forum" section. Radhika Desai, a professor of political science at the University of Manitoba in Canada, shared her views with us on topics such as "de-dollarization," the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative, and China-US relations.

THE DE-DOLLARIZATION

Capital News: The United States' greatest power comes from having the world's leading reserve currency, which gives the US enormous buying power because it gives it the ability to print the world's money and have it widely accepted abroad and to control who gets it. But we can see that US assets, including US treasuries, are becoming less attractive. In your opinion, what aspects of crisis is the current US dollar system facing today? And what drives de-dollarization?

Radhika Desai:On the whole, what we have in discussions of the dollar system are two opposed shools. One set of discourses and scholarly literature continually assumes that the dollar system is completely natural, that it can go on forever. There's basically an entire academic industry telling the whole world that the dollar system is fantastic. In contrast, my own work has actually looked underneath these discourses and discovered a very different reality.

Second school consists of the literature that looks at de-dollarization. It points to this or that difficulty that the dollar has. In particular, it is pointing to the rise of alternatives, for example, swap agreements between central banks, agreements between countries to trade in one and others currencies, the rise of new institutions, the rise of a new sources of finance, particularly from China, of which course the Belt and Road Initiative is such an important part.

So these two sets of literature stand apart. Unfortunately, the first is completely wrong, while the second is right but it is not complete. To fully comprehend the contemporary interest in de-dollarization, it is necessary to consider two aspects:

Firstly, the emergence of alternative arrangements. Secondly, the longstanding internal contradictions within the dollar system.

In your question, you asked about a couple of different things. First, you said that the United States dollar has been the world's currency for a very long time, etc. But the fact of the matter is that the United States has never served as of the world currency in a stable fashion. This is the key. Once we understand this key fact, it begins to unlock why de-dollarization is happening. This process is driven, on one hand, by the emergence of alternatives and, on the other hand, by the inherent contradictions within the dollar system.

You also highlighted another point: the idea, often echoed in literature, that the United States enjoys the "exorbitant privilege" of borrowing in its currency and of unrestricted money printing. And these days we even have modern monetary theory that has come along and said either that any country can print as much money as it likes, or they say at least the United States can do so. But in reality, this has never been true. This is evidenced by the weakening and softening of the treasury market. It is a really good example. Another really interesting example of how this ‘exhorbitant privilege’ does not really exist. President Biden came to power riding on a wave of enormous hope that he was going to engage in a lot of spending in order to fix the U.S. economy, fix the health system, everything. But in reality, his spending programs have been quite modest. And even with that modest spending program, he has had to raise taxes. Now, if the United States could borrow with impunity, why would he raise taxes? He certainly did not want to.

And then another point I will make is that recently the United States had the cliffhanger moment when it looked as though the Republicans were not going to agree to lift the debt ceiling. But in the end, they did lift the debt ceiling and everybody thought that a major crisis was averted. But actually, what people don't realize is that now the United States is going to borrow even more money, almost $1 trillion more, before the year’s end. And this is going to create new burdens on the already overloaded treasury market. Remember the first many months of the year, the government was not issuing any new debt because the debt ceiling had not been raised and even then the treasury market was weak. Now it's going to issue even more that.

So what's the treasury market going to do now？To truly grasp the developments within the dollar system, an understanding of its internal contradictions is paramount. I would say that these contradictions begin from the misconception, prevalent in literature on U.S. dollar hegemony, that it is entirely natural for the currency of the most influential or powerful nation to serve as the world's currency. In reality, history contradicts this notion. Dating back to the early 20th century, U.S. ruling elites have aspired to establish the dollar as the world's primary currency. They envisage a role akin to the pound sterling's during the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the circumstances that facilitated sterling's global role were exceptional, rooted in Britain's extensive empire and the surpluses derived from its non-settler colonies.

This distinction between settler colonies like Canada and New Zealand and non-settler colonies like Africa and British India is crucial. The non-settler colonies were essentially paying in this period for the industrialization of the settler colony. This is the way sterling worked. The famous ‘capital exports’ through which Britain supplied the world with liquidity were possible only thank to the surpluses extracted from the non-settler colonies which were exported primarily to the settler colonies and to Europe.

The U.S., lacking colonies from which to extract surpluses, could only issue dollars and provide global liquidity by running deficits. Yet, these deficits have always been a problem. Belgian economist Robert Triffin highlighted this predicament in the late 1950s: while deficits provide global liquidity, they simultaneously undermine the dollar's attractiveness, applying downward pressure. This was the famous ‘Triffin Dilemma’ So, this situation already forced the U.S. essentially to pay out gold instead of dollars. Eventually by 1971, once the gold was exhausted, it had to break the link between the dollar and gold.

My work, notably my book "Geopolitical Economy," underscores that post-1971, in order to overcome the Triffin Dilemma in which the fact that the United States is spending more abroad than it is earning lowers the value of the dollar, what they have done is they have essentially expanded dollar-denominated financial activity in order to overcome the dilemma. Because although for trade and productive and investment reasons, people may not want the dollar, they may still want the dollar for speculative reasons and predatory reasons.

This big financial casino that the United States has opened and operated since the 1970s has required the United States to constantly expand dollar-denominated financial activity, which is extremely volatile. It has been bad for the U.S. Economy. It has made the U.S. economy productively weaker and it has been a disaster for the rest of the world because it leads to regular financial crisis. The East Asian financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis stand as examples of these repercussions ingrained in the dollar's operation.

Ultimately, the current unraveling of the dollar system can be traced to the U.S.'s diminishing capacity to sustain this financial casino. As this casino begins to falter, the demise of the dollar system looms on the horizon.

Capital News: You just said about the internal contradiction from a history perspective, which reminds me of the trust problem. The world has been happy to use the US dollar as the global reserve currency because they trusted the US government to make the right decisions on the US dollar that would take into consideration the economic interests not only of American people but also of the remaining 7 billion people outside America who also rely on the US dollar to fund their international transactions. This trust is a key pillar of the resilience of the US dollar as a global reserve currency. But in recent decades, this trust has begun to erode because America has occasionally used the privilege of having the global reserve currency as a weapon against other countries. Examples include Russia, and Afghanistan, whose reserves had been sequestered essentially been stolen. How does this affect the credibility of the US dollar?

Radhika Desai: What's you talking about is what's recently come to be known as the weaponization of the dollar system. Again, I think it's important to underline that the dollar system has always run for the benefit of the United States. And the idea that somehow the world was happy to use the dollar has always been an idea again pedaled by the academics, scholars who are constantly talking about how the dollar system is completely natural and good and how the United States is providing a public service to the rest of the world.

However, as I have outlined, the dollar has never maintained a stable role as the world's primary currency. The only reason the world was using the dollar was because they had no alternative. The United States essentially rejected Keynes’s proposals for a multilaterally organized currency back in 1944 at Bretton Woods. Since then, it has always worked to try to ensure that any alternative that emerges is destroyed or not accepted or that it doesn't work. Today, however, U.S.'s ability to do that has decreased. That's why alternatives are emerging already.

Now, coming back to the weaponization of the dollar system. You're absolutely right. The dollar system has been recognized in recent years as a part of a larger strategy of the U.S. administration to counter or compensate for the decline of the U.S. and the decline of its economy. This decline has ramifications for the U.S.'s capacity to exert influence on global affairs, reflecting a decline in U.S. power and imperialism.

In response, the U.S. has employed various means at its disposal to mitigate these effects and to penalize nations that challenge its dominance. As you mentioned, recent instances involve the seizure of reserves from Russia, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Iran, and other nations that have historically faced unfavorable treatment from the United States.

Significantly, this behavior has prompted heightened awareness in the world as a whole about these US practices, particularly regarding Russia's experience. Russia's status as a permanent member of the Security Council and a major global power underscores the gravity of these actions. This realization is compounded by the emergence of alternatives, largely facilitated by China's prominent role and the availability of financial resources. Consequently, the dollar system is undergoing transformation.

Another crucial aspect to consider is the pivotal role played by countries that maintain an open capital account, enabling wealthy individuals within those countries to funnel their resources into the dollar-based system.

Conversely, China's management of its capital account has shown that maintaining control over capital flows can lead to wealth accumulation and national power without relying on the U.S.-centered financial arena.

This growing realization aligns with the perspective that effective capital account management is essential for development and for retaining domestic wealth within the country and investing it there. Should more nations adopt this approach, the foundations of the dollar system would be further eroded. Meanwhile, alternative systems, exemplified by China and its BRICS counterparts, emphasize production and trade rather than speculative finance, offering a distinct model for payments and financial interactions.

In conclusion, the emergence of a new system, with a focus on stability and production, represents a positive development. The historical issues faced by developing nations under the dollar system, such as financial crises, currency devaluation, and capital flight, could be mitigated in this evolving landscape.

Capital News: What you just said about the third world countries reminded me of the “debt trap” accusation. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said that the U.S. is working hard to counter China's influence in international institutions and in leading to developing countries, and that by lending to developing countries, China leaves them trapped in debt. However, according to World Bank statistics, multilateral financial institutions and commercial creditors account for more than 80 percent of the sovereign debt of developing countries. Since last year, the US has launched unprecedented massive interest rate hikes, making the debt problems of certain countries even worse. How do you view the issue of debt in developing countries? Who is the main culprit behind the exacerbation of this problem?

Radhika Desai: Certainly, the financial relationship between Western countries and third world nations has been fraught with complexities.

On one hand, Western nations exhibit a desire to lend to third world countries, primarily motivated by the opportunity to levy high interest rates. Moreover, this desire to lend is also prompted by the substantial cash reserves their financial institutions have. When financial institutions hold significant cash reserves, they must seek avenues to earn interest on these reserves. So, they must loan this money out. They say come on and borrow money from us. The dominant narrative is one of first world doing third world countries a favour and making capital available to them when, in reality, first world financial institutions are desperate to lend. Inevitbaly, this need to lend has resulted in lending volumes far surpassing sustainable repayment capacities of the borrower countries. This discrepancy is further compounded by the fact that the loans are often extended for non-productive purposes or under terms that do not facilitate effective repayment. Unlike loans directed towards productive ventures that generate revenue, Western loans frequently lack such foresight, culminating in an inability to repay the debt. This phenomenon has recurrently engendered debt crises, attributable to the Western financial framework's disregard for the viability of repayment and ultimately for long-term productive investment.

This disregard has become particularly problematic since the 1982 third world debt crisis. Since then, the U.S. and its allied countries have largely ignored the fundamental principle that both debtor and creditor are jointly responsible when debt repayment issues arise. Resolution necessitates shared efforts to alleviate the situation, share the pain and formulate a feasible repayment strategy. However, this mutual responsibility has been eclipsed by the Western approach. Anyway, this is the problematic nature of the western financial system.

China has emerged as a prominent player in the global financial landscape over the past decade and a half. This emergence has positioned China as a substantial lender, eliciting reactions from Western nations that seek to attribute the debt-related predicaments that they have orchestrated to China. This is the crux of the matter. Western powers claim that China engages in a practice known as "debt trap diplomacy." In truth, the nations that have historically woven a debt trap are, indeed, the Western ones. Even in the 1970s, there was a book titled "The Debt Trap" underscoring this pattern. Western nations have habitually enticed poor countries into debt traps.

As you rightly point out, if one scrutinizes both the quantity and the quality of Chinese lending, it remains a relatively minor fraction of the overall debt burden carried by third world nations in terms of sheer quantity.

Qualitatively, moreover, China’s credit is much better. China's lending practices are generally oriented towards productive and infrastructure-centric endeavors. Furthermore, China demonstrates a willingness to engage in debt renegotiations in the face of repayment difficulties. This contrasts starkly with Western practices, where harsh structural adjustment programs have been imposed on countries undergoing debt crises, particularly from the 1980s onward. The effect is to make these countries work harder and become poorer at the same time, compounding the repayment difficulties while making cheap goods from these countries available for the West. The austerity measures imposed during the third world debt crisis subjected many nations to severe consequences, effectively leading to lost two decades of development during the 1980s, even extending into the 1990s.

The outcome of these programs was economic contraction in numerous countries, resulting in negative growth rates year after year. These imposed terms and conditions epitomize the true concept of a "debt trap." The notion of a so called “Chinese-led debt trap” lacks substantial evidence, as far as my understanding goes.

Capital News: We can observe that as the internal contradictions are mounting within the dollar system. Outside there are a series of alternatives and possibilities that are emerging. Countries being hurt by U.S. sanctions are developing ways to get around them or undermine the U.S.’s power to impose them. China’s central bank has created a digital currency, which will make China less exposed to U.S. sanctions. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Brazil have indicated their willingness to promote trade settlement with China using the China’s RMB instead of dollars. What do you think about the benefits of the internationalization of the RMB? How do you view the progress and achievements of the internationalization of the RMB in recent years?

Radhika Desai: Let me answer this question by giving a bit of background. There are many misunderstandings to clear up.

First of all, many proponents of the durability of the dollar system often argue that there is no clear successor currency in sight. The Renminbi is not, they say, a potential successor, because China lacks the capacity or willingness to internationalize the Renminbi fully.

It is important to understand exactly what is wrong with this perspective. To respond to this by saying that the Renminbe can and should be internatioalised would be to misunderstand the issue.

If we take into account the historical imbalances that resulted when the currency of one country tried to be the currency of the world. We know the imbalances and shortcomings of the dollar system. And even the sterling system had huge problems even though the vast British empire underpinned it. . If we consider these limitations of national currencies posing as world currencies, we come to realize that de-dollarization doesn't mean the emergence of a direct successor, another national currency posing as the world’s currency. If the limitations of the past are to be overcome, de-dollarization must unfold in a way as to create a transformed international monetary framework altogether.

I just want to put that out because that forms the larger context in which I want to discuss Renminbi internationalization. So having said this, I'm not saying that the Renminbi is not being internationalized or will not be internationalized or that the internationalization of the Renminbi will not proceed further. I think all these things are true and they will happen and they are happening. So that's good.

However, the pattern of internationalization of the Renminbi will be, must be, completely different from the way in which the dollar system has been internationalized. The dollar's internationalization has involved expanding a speculative and predatory financial system in ways that have not just impoverished the rest of the world but also deindustrialized the US economy itself. Such internationalization would run counter to the sustainable and broad-based development objectives of China and other nations.

China's leadership is acutely aware of the imperative for development. So, in that sense, I think the internationalization of the Renminbi is expected to align with development goals, both for China itself and for countries involved in cooperative developmental initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc. This already means that its internationalization will take a very different form.

For trade purposes, China will certainly promote the international use of the Renminbi to facilitate trade transactions with its partners. But China is also doing other things, for example, accepting other countries’ currencies and so on. This will foster a markedly different international financial system, distinct from the dollar-centric model.

And I would say that if the Chinese government were to pursue a type of internationalization of the Renminbi which mimics that of the dollar, China's development will rapidly deteriorate. It will rapidly go into reverse. Because China has and needs to maintain a financial system which is very different from the U.S. financial system. That is the backbone of its spectacular development so far. China's system emphasizes productive investment rather than speculative lending, ensuring that finance remains closely tied to production. To maintain this structure and the symbiotic relationship between banks and industries, China must pursue a unique path of Renminbi internationalization.

In any case, China does not want internationalization of the sorr the dollar has pursued. It is a form of dominance. China has always said that we are not looking for hegemony, we want to have a multipolar world, we want to have a world in which there is a lot of development.

China will undoubtedly do what it can to facilitate this, but it cannot so it on its own. Other countries in the world also have to cultivate the sort of leadership that drives development within their borders, they too need to take responsibility for their own development, much as China has taken responsibility for its own development.

In conclusion, the internationalization of the Renminbi will take a form that represents a departure from the trajectory of currency internationalization that sterling and the dollar have pursued so far. As long as China remains the most important country for a very long time, the Renminbi will be a very important currency. Perhaps the most important but not the only one. The Renminbi will play significant roles without seeking exclusive dominance.

Capital News: If the U.S. dollar is no longer the world’s NO.1 currency, what would be the NO.1 global currency?

Radhika Desai: That's exactly what I'm trying to say: there will not be a single reserve currency in the world. The Renminbi may be, likely will be, the most important of them, but countries will keep a portfolio of reserve currencies depending on their trading, investment and financial needs.

THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Capital News: What’s your impression of the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI)? What impact has the Belt and Road Initiative had on the global economy, geopolitics, and international cooperation?

Radhika Desai: I think that the Belt and Road Initiative is massive. With theSilk RoadEconomic Belt and the21st Century Maritime Silk Road, China can reach out to the entire world. Through that, it is engaging the rest of the world on terms that are both quantitative and qualitatively superior to what the west has to offer.

First of all, let me say that China's Belt and Road Initiative is an excellent way for China, on the one hand, to support its own development, but also to create the sort of development world-wide within which China as a very leading economy can continue to thrive.

Secondly, on the global economy, it has certainly aided in expanding the global economy, producing higher and better growth, etc.

Thirdly, it is the cutting edge of the change in geopolitics. I mean this in the sense that if you think about what defines the geopolitical economy of the world, on one hand, there is a relative decline of the West—not absolutely, of course, but in relative terms. The weight of Western economies, particularly the U.S. economy, in the global economy is diminishing while that of the BRICS is rising. But both China’s economic performance and China's initiatives like the BRI are vastly superior to that of the other BRICS country. The decline of the West and the ascent of China and other emerging powers reshape the geopolitical landscape, positioning China at the forefront of this change.

And then, finally, you were talking about international governance. I would say that the BRI is laying the foundation for the qualitatively new institutions of international governance we need. If you think about it, people often regard the Bretton Woods system as a great one, but they tend to overlook the fact that U.S. intervention in the design ensured that it essentially became a set of international governance arrangements weighted in favor of the United States and imperial countries in general.

So, what we are witnessing now is the world approaching the cusp of a new type of international governance system. This system will mark a shift towards a post-imperial international governance framework, with foundations built on principles like mutual cooperation for mutual benefit, rather than relying on imperial power and subordination, as has been the case with institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO, particularly. The United Nations stands apart in this context, and I believe it plays a role in these changes to international economic governance.

I'm not surprised at all by the insistence of countries like China and many others on revisiting the original goals of the UN charter. The UN charter is based on all excellent principles. However, these principles have suffered erosion over time. So, these countries are saying we should restore the original UN charter and go back to those principles. This effort can only yield positive outcomes and will be significant in the context of post-imperial international governance structures.

And I also feel that another crucial aspect to consider is that, over the course of the past several decades, the US and Western countries have forefront in aligning UN institutions with corporate funding, especially from Western corporations. Unfortunately, this trend has had a tendency to weaken the foundations of the United Nations' institutions. In my opinion, a shift should occur, moving towards funding the UN system by its member countries, as originally intended. This approach would ensure that the purposes and projects of the United Nations remain aligned with their original intent. In that sense, I anticipate that China will assume a leading role in establishing a post-imperial system of global governance.

Capital News: In your opinion, what challenges does the BRI face internationally? What are the roots of these challenges?

Radhika Desai: This is also a very important question because the key source of instability in the world order today is not the emergence of China or other countries. Rather, it stems from the West's determined efforts to resist this emergence. Unfortunately, while China and the rest of the world, are diligently striving to empower others to take on better roles and encouraging positive behavior change, they shouldn't depend on the West changing its stance any time soon. I anticipate that the West will probably evolve due to a combination of factors, including external pressure from China's growing role and the world's increasing preference for China over the United States. These pressures will mount over time. As this transformation unfolds, people within these countries will likely recognize the inherent flaws in their domestic governance and in their global interactions. Both aspects will require comprehensive reform.

For instance, consider the current U.S. scenario where Professor Cornel West is running for the presidency, potentially as a Green Party candidate. While Professor West may not have high chances of winning, his candidacy and the issues he's addressing—such as the domestic U.S. economy, U.S. global relations, and ending the wars that the United States keeps engaging in—are crucial.

The United States is undoubtedly grappling with deep-seated challenges. The upcoming election offers a valuable opportunity to reshape the discourse within the U.S., and Professor West could play a significant role in effecting this change. Such efforts could potentially diminish the obstacles impeding the emergence of a post-imperial international governance system. However, only time will tell if these expectations materialize."

Capital News: We have noticed that the United States has implemented a series of anti-China policies in recent years, aiming to provoke a “new Cold War” against China. Under this mindset of Cold War and Zero-sum game, the United States views the Belt and Road Initiative as China’s ideological expansion and geopolitical competition, using economic interests as bait. How do you view this “new Cold War” policy? What impact does it have on the global political and economic landscape?

Radhika Desai: First of all, let's address the 'new Cold War,' which can be roughly dated back to the Trump presidency. Although changes were underway before that, like Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' and other factors, the 'new Cold War' against China is best understood as follows:

In the 80s and 90s, particularly in the 90s, the United States imagined that by fostering friendlier relations with China, it could maintain China's role as a subordinate producer of inexpensive goods, driven by low-cost labor. This was the vision of the West. However, as the mid-2000s arrived and especially after the 2008 financial crisis, it became evident that China was not going to give up its commitment to socialism, its commitment to developing its own economy, its commitment to technologically upgrading its productive economy and so on. Realizing this, Western nations progressively adopted more adversarial behaviors, giving rise to the 'new Cold War' against China.

It's worth noting that the proxy war against Russia is an integral part of the broader strategy to isolate and weaken China. The proxy war and the 'new Cold War' serve a common purpose.

The problem for the United States and its allies is that this is not succeeding. Even at the outset of the 'new Cold War,' many countries, including Europe and Japan, expressed discontent with U.S. sanctions and their extraterritorial impact, hindering European trade with China.

So, people were discontented with various aspects of the ongoing conflicts, including the proxy war involving Russia and the imposition of sanctions on Russia. The extraterritorial nature of these sanctions has only intensified the existing conflicts.

What is becoming very clear as is that this “new Cold War”, which is largely at the moment, as far as China is concerned, confined to sanctions, is that it is boomeranging. It is not achieving its intended goals. Instead, it's making the situation more difficult for the United States itself and particularly for its allies.

Indeed, many people are saying that considering the impact of this situation on Europe's economy and the way it is being adversely affected, one could even argue that more than just a proxy war against Russia, the current conflict over Ukraine is, in fact, a United States war against Europe, aimed at destroying Europe's productive economy.

In this context, at the moment, it looks as the European leaders that are in office at the moment are going along with it. However, to be candid, considering the economic toll Europe is enduring – which impacts both European capitalists and ordinary citizens – I am uncertain whether this situation can be sustained for an extended period. Despite all the discourse about Western unity and the like, I anticipate significant destabilizing developments within this supposed unity of the Western bloc.

In summary, the "new Cold War" against China is destined to fall short of its goals. While it will indeed pose challenges for China, they will be manageable ones. China will confront these challenges and remain resilient. The approach might lead China to adopt a more amicable stance. If the United States were not pursuing this course, it might choose a more accommodating approach. The actions of the United States and Western nations suggest that their declarations are not entirely genuine. They frequently express their commitment to global development, yet as soon as one part of the world begins developing like China, they react with hysteria. It shows you that their professed commitment to development is nothing but hypocrisy.

We might hope for a more constructive approach from the Western world. Even if such an approach is not forthcoming, it's important to recognize that China is well-equipped to handle any challenges. In my assessment, the only scenarios capable of significantly disrupting this course are those involving nuclear conflict or similar extreme circumstances – although such scenarios are far from being part of the agenda, and it's our hope that they remain so.

Capital News: We see that Biden pledged that the U.S. Does not seek a new Cold War, but he has never stopped playing the game of group politics and touting the false narrative of “democracy versus autocracy”. What do you think of the inconsistency between U.S. words and actions?

Radhika Desai: This is a really interesting question and one must recognize the extent to which the United States has experienced decline. The increasing inequality within the United States has given rise to profound social and political divisions in the U.S. These divisions have given rise to a new politics that are increasingly focused on these internal issues in order to secure electoral victories, but not in order to actually resolve them. Politicians, both Trump and Biden and their like, exploit these issues to get elected, but they resolve nothing.

You will remember that around the time when there was G7 meeting in Japan, President Biden had to go home early because he had to manage the debt ceiling crisis. The acrimony between Democrats and Republicans, as well as the deep-seated divisions within the United States, stem from the nation's declining status and the escalating inequalities brought about by financialization and related factors.

The reason I bring this up is that everybody hoped when President Biden was elected that he would herald a reversal of the policies introduced during the Trump era. But instead of these policies, in fact, he has taken an even more anti-China stance and he has even initiated a new conflict with Russia, something that even Trump refrained from doing. The reason is very simple: If President Biden does not cater to the same factors that led to Trump's policies, he stands little chance of getting re-elected. And we already know that, in order to get elected, President Biden significantly outspent Trump. And in the coming elections, he's going to have to do that again and do it in the outspent Trump even more, if he contends with a candidate similar to Trump.

In conclusion, I would say that the reason why we are seeing this continuation of new cold war and similar policies, is because within the U.S context, you have to realize that a lot of people are grappling with hardship. And what Trump has done is he has started a way of dealing with it not by dealing with the root causes of the suffering, which is the United States’ productive decline. A good leadership of the U.S. could say that what the U.S needs to do is to focus on reviving its productive economy, withdraw from involvement in foreign conflicts, and fostering greater equality within the country, etc. Actual sources of these issues need to be addressed, but instead US politicians are saying to people who are suffering that the real cause of your problem is China and we are going to attack China.

Hence, the foundation of the anti-China policy appears rooted in U.S. domestic politics. From my perspective, it seems unlikely to change in the near future.

Capital News: Recently, U.S. government frequently embraces “de-risking” to get Europe on board with measures to deny key technology to China. What do you think of the term “de-risking” and is this term a reflection of the U.S. new Cold War policy?

Radhika Desai: It is definitely a reflection of the new cold war, highlighting the problematic nature of conducting this Cold War for the United States in general, and for the Western countries, particularly the United States and the broader Western nations.

So, what do I mean by that? First and foremost, the conduct of this new cold war poses several challenges for the United States for several reasons.

Firstly, the U.S. economy, over the last couple of decades, two or three decades, has become very reliant on the Chinese economy. U.S. corporations have become significantly dependent on China's economic ties. As a consequence, segments within the U.S. ruling and capitalist classes that feel threatened by China's technological progress, particularly those in Silicon Valley. Some advocate for engaging in a new form of global competition centered around China, while others were saying, no, why are we doing this? We cannot afford to do this due to the potential risks and costs involved. This creates substantial ambiguity within the U.S. elites regarding their stance on a new Cold War involving China.

It's crucial to remember that this deep ambiguity also extends to the Western alliance. The Europeans and the Japanese want to continue to be able to trade and do business with China. They don't want a new cold war, etc.

Clearly what some people were once talking about which is “decoupling” from China. Decoupling from China will be a disaster for the United States. Even though US-China economic relationships have been loosening up a little bit, a complete decoupling would have severe negative repercussions for the United States.

In response, instead of decoupling, they are now using the term “de-risking” as an alternative approach. So that how will they somehow manage on the one hand to wager new cold war and on the other hand to deal with the inevitable economic dislocations that it will bring in its strain. So, the word de-risking is being used in this context.

But, quite frankly, it's unclear whether European leaders, like the one using this term, or President Biden truly understand the full implications of 'de-risking.' They appear to be groping in the dark, as they find themselves caught between the need for China's economic contributions and the concerns posed by it.

Capital News: How do you think China and the US should avoid a new Cold War?

Radhika Desai: China is doing everything in its power to avoid the new cold war. The Chinese leadership can and should continue doing what it's doing. I think they seem to be handling the situation skillfully. It's important to demonstrate to the world that the China is bending over backwards to repair this relationship as indeed they are. There is no reason why should not the U.S. and China benefit from a mutually beneficial relationship.

The problem lies in the fact that the United States seems uninterested in such a relationship. Rather, the United States wants a relationship in which it extracts one-sided benefits, which is no longer a viable option.

And since that is not available to it, the United States finds itself in a dilemma where it can't decide whether to continue to relate to China and be as close economically to China as it has been. Remember back in the 2000s people even was talking about “Chimerica”. That is how deeply integrated the U.S. became dependent on China, not so vice versa China was never as dependent on the U.S.

Anyway, U.S. seems to want to have its cake and eat it too, but of course it cannot. It's like the child who wants to eat and sleep at the same time. It can't do that. And so it's going to cry. That's what we are seeing. The United States is reacting with frustration – throwing tantrum after tantrum.

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